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Erdogan moves against ‘parallel state’
The rift between the Gülen 
movement and Turkey’s ruling 
party is widening. 
By David Tittensor 
The Gülen movement, 
which its 72-year-old 
founder, retired imam 
Fethullah Gülen, denies is even a 
movement, is both political and not 
political—that is, it is not a political 
party and, to date, appears to have 
no intention of making the transition 
from being a social-religious 
movement to the hustings. 
While it remains apolitical in the 
formal sense, the Gülen movement 
has no qualms about providing 
support for the political party that is 
consonant with its values. This was 
very much the case with Turgut 
Özal’s Anavatan Partisi (Motherland 
Party) after the 1980 military coup. 
Özal—a follower of the Naqshibandi 
Shaykh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897–
1980)—provided an effective political 
climate in which the Gülen 
movement could operate. He lifted a 
ban on Fethullah Gülen’s preaching, 
as he wanted to use the imam’s 
ideas as a countervailing force to 
radical Islamic groups, and 
liberalised the education sector, 
which allowed the movement to 
marshal its capital and open private 
schools and preparatory schools that 
have become the backbone of its 
global empire. The situation was 
much the same when the ruling 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice 
and Development Party, AKP) 
achieved power in 2002.  
Although the Gülen movement and 
the AKP have emerged from different 
Islamic, strands—the AKP from 
Necmettin Erbakan’s more right-wing 
Milli Görüş (National View) 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the Gülen movement from a civic 
Islam inspired by Said Nursi (1876–
1960)—they have converged in a 
number of areas. Both are pro-
globalisation and market 
liberalisation, and both wanted to 
free Turkey from the military 
tutelage that has regularly 
suppressed both movements and 
create a more conservative Muslim 
society.  
This has seen the 
AKP support many of 
the Gülen 
movement’s 
educational 
endeavours in 
Turkey and abroad, 
with the President, 
Abdullah Gül, and 
Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan 
either visiting Gülen schools overseas 
or praising their efforts.  
Recently, however, the AKP and the 
movement have begun to have 
significant disagreements. 
These first surfaced in 2010 with the 
Gaza flotilla incident in which the 
Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, 
organised by the Turkish non-
government organisation, the İHH 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation, was 
attacked in international waters by 
Israeli commandos, while trying to 
break the Gaza blockade. Nine 
people on the Mavi Marmara were 
killed, eight of whom were Turkish 
nationals.  
Erdoğan responded forcefully, calling 
the attack a ‘cause for war’. He 
expelled the Israeli ambassador, 
imposed sanctions and suspended all 
military agreements with Israel. In 
contrast, Gülen was pro-Israel, 
possibly in line with his interfaith 
dialogue advocacy. He stated that 
the attempt to break the blockade 
was ‘a sign of defying authority, and 
will not lead to fruitful matters’, and 
added that it was ‘out of the question 
to call these people martyrs. They 
knew they were going there to get 
killed and went at their own 
discretion’. 
The conflict between Turkey and 
Kurdish insurgent groups is another 
Fethullah Gülen 
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area of disagreement between the 
Gülen movement and the AKP. Gülen 
takes a more hardline approach, 
indicating that the Kuridstan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) is not 
trustworthy, while the AKP is keen to 
negotiate a solution to the conflict. 
Illustrative of this rift was an 
attempt, in February 2012, by the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, to 
interrogate Turkey’s intelligence 
chief, Hakan Fidan, one of Erdoğan’s 
closest allies, over efforts by the 
National Intelligence Agency (Milli 
İstihbarat Teşkilatı-(MİT)) to broker a 
peace with the Kurdish insurgents. 
The PKK has reportedly been 
targeting Gülen institutions as they 
are seen to be ‘stealing’ potential 
Kurdish militants, and it is alleged 
that the movement instigated the 
interrogation of Fidan because of the 
MİT’s attempts to broker peace with 
the Kurdish rebels. Erdoğan 
retaliated by initiating a law to shut 
down dershanes (preparatory 
schools)—the movement runs 
approximately 1600 such schools in 
Turkey.  
The move to shut down the 
dershanes, which provide the 
movement with a significant revenue 
stream and employment network, is 
a particularly significant blow, and 
provoked a return blow—allegedly, 
the instigation by the Gülen 
movement, in December 2013, of a 
corruption investigation against the 
AKP. 
The investigation has already seen 
three cabinet ministers forced to 
resign and brought to light 
allegations of massive money 
laundering, bribery and fraud. It also 
has the potential to entangle 
Erdoğan’s son, Bilal, after the release 
of wiretapped conversations in which 
Erdoğan purportedly urges his son to 
hide money stashed in a number of 
properties. This, in turn, has seen 
Erdoğan purge the judiciary and the 
police force of suspected Gülenists.  
Pundits have labelled the 
movement’s latest salvo a significant 
challenge to the government. 
Erdoğan, however, has dismissed the 
allegations as a ‘dirty operation’ that 
is the work of a ‘parallel state’—an 
apparent veiled reference to the 
Gülen movement—and that, in future 
‘there won’t be a state within a state. 
We will root them out’. 
So far, the scandal has not had the 
effect desired by the Gülen 
movement. The AKP passed a recent 
litmus test in March by winning about 
45 per cent of the vote in local 
elections—although there have been 
allegations of vote rigging. 
Nevertheless, the win indicates that 
the Gülen movement—despite its 
claimed 3 to 4 million followers—has 
had minimal impact on the election 
outcome, suggesting that things are 
far from the lose–lose situation for 
the Islamist camp as a whole 
suggested by some commentators. 
Rather, the result indicates—
presuming Erdoğan’s allegations 
about the Gülen movement’s ‘dirty 
operation’ are true—that if the 
movement has indeed engaged in 
some hard politicking, it is likely to 
come off second best. This is 
particularly the case if Erdoğan 
follows through with his threat to 
extradite Fethullah Gülen, who has 
lived in self-imposed exile in the 
United States since 1999, and has 
been granted permanent residence 
status there. However, given the 
support from influential Americans 
that led to Gülen obtaining his 
residence status, such an outcome 
seems unlikely.  
Dr David Tittensor is a research fellow, 
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York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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